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INTRODUCTION
Is American democracy sick? If so, what ails it? More importantly, can
the disease be cured? Can its symptoms be alleviated by imaginative and
well-crafted laws? Or is it a genetic disorder embedded in the DNA of
modem representative government and thus unlikely to yield to therapeutic
manipulation?
In recent years, advocates of increased campaign finance regulation
have often expressed the view that our democracy is indeed pitifully ill, that
it has fallen prey to an inert citizenry and the pervasive and undue influence
of money.' Reformers implicitly believe, however, that the disease is
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1. The literature is voluminous. A classic in the genre is Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of
American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19. For but one additional example from
many that could be cited, see Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: Love and a
Question, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 789 (1998). According to Neubome, "That we suffer from
democratic malaise is undeniable," as indicated by the fact that "powerful private actors threaten
to turn the free market in ideas into a wealth-driven oligopoly," that there is an "appallingly low
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curable, that it was caused by a dysfunctional system of financing political
campaigns, and that it could accordingly be remedied simply by
overhauling that system. The recently enacted Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act of 2002, commonly known as McCain-Feingold, incorporated many of
the new restrictions that most reformers thought ought to be included in that
overhaul, including prohibitions on soft-money contributions and
regulations on issue ads.2
In Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance, Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres join the chorus of reform advocates who believe
that democracy is ailing, that the cause of its illness is a fundamentally
flawed campaign finance system, and that it can be cured if that system is
properly overhauled. The overhaul they propose, however, departs radically
from what reformers have conventionally advocated. Instead of direct
public funding of election campaigns, they propose giving citizens public
money-"Patriot dollars"--with which to support candidates or causes of
their choice. Instead of advocating severe limits on private campaign
contributions, or ever-more complete disclosure from the ever-growing
number of participants in the political process, they propose mandating
contributor anonymity while permitting substantial (although not unlimited)
private giving. Ackerman and Ayres make extravagant claims for their new
paradigm's ability to transform political life. With Patriot dollars available
to them, voters will not remain disengaged and inert: Patriot dollars will
rekindle citizen sovereignty and give "renewed vitality to [Americans']
democratic commitments." 3 And by eliminating the ability of contributors
to credibly communicate the amount of their gifts to candidates (and thus to
secure for themselves a corresponding amount of influence), the secret
donation booth will "disrupt the special-interest dealing ' 4 we now take for
granted. Ackerman and Ayres's proposals for Patriot dollars and the secret
donation booth represent genuinely new ideas about how campaign finance
should be reformed.
Voting with Dollars was conceived and written before the passage of
McCain-Feingold, and published when that law's prospects remained dim
despite the fact that it had passed the House. At present, unfortunately for
the.authors, the book can hardly be considered timely: Although its authors
claimed to be putting their paradigm forward as a genuine alternative for
Congress to consider instead of McCain-Feingold, its publication
level of participation in the democratic process," and that the quality of democratic discourse is
"appalling." Id. at 793-94.
2. Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, §§ 101, 201, 116 Stat. 81,
82-86, 88-90 (2002) (to be codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441).
3. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR
CAMPAIGN FINANCE 5 (2002).
4. See id. at 9.
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practically coincided with McCain-Feingold's enactment.5 Congress rarely
can gather the momentum to engage in serious debate, much less to pass
legislation, regarding campaign finance. It is therefore unlikely that
Ackerman and Ayres's book will have any practical effect whatsoever: At
least for the time being, the legislative debate over campaign finance reform
is over.
Nonetheless, the authors are important scholars, their ideas are
provocatively imaginative, and the topic of campaign finance is not
insignificant just because Congress is not likely to revisit it any time soon.
Moreover, Ackerman and Ayres claim to have devised a campaign finance
regime that would solve two vexing predicaments-namely, how to kindle
citizen engagement in politics and how to purge the legislative process of
selfish interest-group rent-seeking. Because it addresses and claims to have
answers to these questions, Voting with Dollars deserves serious attention.
The principal thesis of this Review is that even in the unlikely event
that it were enacted into law, the new paradigm would almost certainly fail
to achieve the benefits the authors so confidently predict: Patriot dollars
will not ignite citizen interest in politics, nor will the secret donation booth
end special-interest legislation. This, I argue, is because both widespread
citizen disengagement and a legislative process dominated by interest-group
competition (in which moneyed interests are important, but not the only,
players) are practically inevitable characteristics of our complex modem
democracy. The prevailing system of financing political campaigns is not a
but-for cause of these phenomena, nor will reforming that system alleviate
them. More particularly, it is quixotic to expect that either citizen
disengagement or interest-group competition will yield significantly to the
reforms embodied in Ackerman and Ayres's new paradigm, despite its
imaginativeness and originality.
Making this argument is not my only object in this Review. The book's
manner of exposition also warrants comment, as does its constitutional
analysis. It should be noted at the outset, however, that I pay scant critical
attention to the details of the new paradigm. That task is best left to a reader
who has been convinced that the new paradigm reflects a sound diagnosis
and wants to make sure its design is not defective.
5. Conceptually, Ackerman and Ayres's new paradigm is worlds apart from McCain-
Feingold. They endorse McCain-Feingold's effort to "sweep soft-money contributions to political
parties into the regulatory framework," id. at 54, but they criticize what they regard to be its "two
important weaknesses," id., namely, its use of low contribution limits to prevent corruption and its
expansive definition of express advocacy. "Rather than restricting the right of interest groups to
endorse candidates, the new paradigm solves the problem of special influence by diluting it with
Patriot dollars and constraining it through the secret donation booth." Id. Interestingly, Ackerman
and Ayres do not mention the key fact that McCain-Feingold rejects the anonymity keystone of
the new paradigm in favor of a continued reliance on disclosure.
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The Review proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the book. The
summary almost, but not quite completely, eschews criticism or comment.
It also contains more than the usual amount of direct quotation, in hopes of
conveying not merely the essence of the new paradigm but also a first-hand
impression of the authors' rhetorical style. Part II argues that the new
paradigm's fatal flaw, one shared by nearly all advocates of campaign
finance reform, is a profound misdiagnosis of what ails modem democracy.
The problem with our democracy is not how we finance campaigns. It is
that the incentives affecting citizen behavior are systematically skewed both
to encourage disengagement and to permit most special-interest deal-
making to go undetected and unpunished. What democracy most
desperately needs is transparent public decisionmaking: Then citizens could
more readily understand what their elected officials are doing and hold
them to account for it at regularly scheduled competitive elections. Part III
comments on the book's exposition and scrutinizes its constitutional
analysis.
PART I
A. The New Paradigm
Voting with Dollars begins by describing and rejecting what its authors
refer to as the "old paradigm ' 6 of campaign finance reform. Ackerman and
Ayres decry three elements in this old paradigm: command and control
regulation (with its emphasis on contribution and expenditure limits),
"publicly subsidized campaigns administered by bureaucrats, ' 7 and full
disclosure. Their claim is that these three elements "are part of the problem,
not part of the solution." 8 To set the system right, they propose a "new
paradigm" with its own three basic elements: Patriot dollars, a secret
donation booth, and selective (instead of comprehensive) restrictions on
private money. 9
The basic idea behind Patriot dollars (which the authors sometimes
refer to simply as Patriot) is that, just as every American citizen "receives a
ballot on election day, he should also receive a special credit card to finance
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 9. It is difficult to know precisely what Ackerman and Ayres are referring to when
they use this phrase. They discuss this aspect of the "old paradigm" as if it were part of the current
debate about how to reform Senate and House campaigns, and the criticisms they offer do seem to
be general ones. At present, however, only presidential campaigns are publicly funded, and then
only if the candidates agree to cap receipt and spending of private money. Moreover, proposals for
public funding of congressional campaigns have always presented such significant design issues
(having to do with how to decide which candidates would qualify for public funding and how to
cleanse the system of incumbent advantage) that they have not had much political viability.
8. Id. at 4.
9. Id. at 9.
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his favorite candidate .... Call it a Patriot card, and suppose that Congress
seeded every voter's account with fifty 'patriot dollars."' 10 Patriot dollars
would turn "campaign finance into a new occasion for citizen
sovereignty-encouraging Americans to vote with their dollars as well as
their ballots, giving renewed vitality to their democratic commitments."'"
The idea for Patriot emerges from what the authors describe as the
threat that "big money" poses to the "standard reconciliation" of the tension
between democratic politics, where citizens are moral equals and public
decisions serve the public good, and the economic market, where citizens
possess unequal assets and are presumed to make decisions in pursuit of
their purely private interests. 12 Big money threatens the deliberative process
by transforming market inequalities into unequal political power. Thus,
"[t]he insulation of democratic politics from the rule of big money is... a
necessary condition for the legitimation of big money in the marketplace
itself." 3
The authors claim that Patriot will play a significant role in insulating
politics from big money, but that is not all they claim it will do. By giving
an equal number of inalienable Patriot dollars to each registered voter, by
requiring citizens to contribute those Patriot dollars anonymously, and by
generally relying on decentralization, flexibility, and individual choice
(rather than centralized bureaucracy) to get public money to candidates and
causes, their new paradigm will "reshape the political marketplace and
enable it to become more responsive to the judgments of equal citizens than
to the preferences of unequal property owners." 14 Because they will have
Patriot dollars to spend, voters will no longer be passive; rather, they will
"take a small but active role throughout the election campaign ....
Americans will reaffirm their relationship as citizens, charged with the
responsibility of steering the republic on a sound course."' 5 The authors call
this predicted mobilization of voters' interest the "citizenship effect" of
Patriot dollars, and they believe that it will produce in turn an "agenda
effect" as candidates become less reliant on "the small elite of private-
money donors" and adjust their messages to appeal directly to the "patriotic
citizenry." '16 Patriot, the authors claim, will solve what they call the
"threshold problem" that designers of public subsidies confront, namely,
the problem of devising criteria to separate serious from frivolous
candidates. "Candidates compete with one another for scarce Patriot
dollars, and those who can't persuade citizens to give will quickly fall by
10. Id. at 4.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Id. at 12-13.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 14.
15. Id. at 15.
16. Id.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1139
1140 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 112:1135
the wayside. 1 7 And there will be no need to design different threshold
subsidies for third parties, again because if citizens like the third party's
platform and candidates, they will support them with their Patriots. Finally,
because of our system of winner-take-all elections, Patriot will not lead to a
fragmented multiparty politics, and although interparty parity is not
guaranteed (as it is under the present system of public funding of
presidential candidates), the authors do not think "snowball effects" pose a
genuine threat.1 8
The secret donation booth is a product of the authors' rejection of the
conventional wisdom that disclosure of contributions is a necessary and
effective tool for fighting corruption. In fact, they think disclosure is the
problem, not the solution. Why, they ask rhetorically, "should candidates
[and the public] know how much money their contributors have
provided?"' 9 Instead, they propose to bar contributors from giving money
directly to candidates, requiring them instead to pass their checks through a
blind trust and then permitting them (as well as noncontributors) to claim
that they have given even more than they actually did. Because neither
givers nor nongivers can credibly claim to have given particular amounts to
particular candidates, the market for political influence will be so full of
noise that it will cease to function. The controlling analogy is the secret
ballot:
Just as the secret ballot makes it more difficult for candidates to buy
votes, a secret donation booth makes it harder for candidates to sell
access or influence. The voting booth disrupts vote-buying because
candidates are uncertain how a citizen actually voted; anonymous
donations disrupt influence peddling because candidates are
uncertain whether givers actually gave what they say they gave.
20
The secret donation booth is also a product of the authors' rejection of
another bit of reformist conventional wisdom, namely, the idea that because
"private funding [of any kind] violates equality and favors the rich,, 21 it
should be abolished altogether. Instead, they argue for a mixed system of
private and public funding, asserting that "[f]latly prohibiting private
campaign contributions would be a real loss to the civic culture. 22 As they
did with Patriot, the authors offer a "cascade of arguments ' ' 23 to support
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 23.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id. at 6.
21. Id. at 32.
22. Id. at 34.
23. Id. at 44.
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their claims about the benefits that the secret donation booth will generate.
As the authors summarize their case:
Voting with both public and private dollars not only promises to
enhance the existing culture of active citizenship. It will also
significantly improve on the operation of a purely patriotic system
of campaign finance. Private dollars flowing through the donation
booth will ameliorate problems that otherwise would be generated
by the selective attention of most citizens, the tendency of Patriot
dollars to starve minoritarian opinions, and the risk of the
occasional snowball effect. No less important, it will check and
balance tendencies by sitting politicians to starve their electoral
opponents by underfunding Patriot.
24
The third element of the new paradigm-selective instead of
comprehensive restrictions on private money--derives from Ackerman and
Ayres's conviction that, because there is a "Sisyphean aspect to the struggle
for ever-more-stringent and comprehensive controls, 25 the first priority of
reform should not be to impose even more restrictive command-and-control
regulation over private contributions. They believe that the secret donation
booth will disrupt most of the special-interest deal-making currently
targeted by contribution limitations, and that patriotic finance will assure
that citizen funding dominates the overall mix of campaign funding.
Accordingly, they propose "only very selective controls-targeted only at
the very biggest givers."2 6 To thwart big contributors from defeating the
blind trust's informational blockade, they propose a "secrecy algorithm"
(which they describe in an appendix) to create noisy signals and make it
difficult for "candidates and donors to establish credible connections
between particular deposits and particular increases in trust balances., 27 In
addition, Ackerman and Ayres propose a "stratospheric" 28 limit on the
amount any individual can contribute, 29 which they defend on both
anticorruption and equality grounds. Finally, turning their attention to
enforcement, they stress the importance of "genuinely impartial
administration" of the new paradigm as well as the clarity of its basic rule:
"Never give or accept gifts that haven't passed through the secret donation
booth."30
24. Id.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 49.
28. Id. at 48.
29. The limits they propose are $5000 for House elections, around $15,000 for Senate races,
and $100,000 for presidential contests. In addition, they propose an annual contribution limit of
$100,000.1d. at 154.
30. Id. at 52.
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The first matter to which the authors address themselves in their
description of "The Paradigm in Practice" is the problem of what to do
about the precandidate stage of elections, the period during which potential
candidates, although reluctant to declare their candidacies publicly, test the
waters. They need funds for this exploratory activity, but funds are unlikely
to be forthcoming either from Patriot dollars or from the secret donation
booth. To meet this need, Ackerman and Ayres resort to the "classic
response of the old paradigm: Let readily identifiable donors give private
money to politicians, constrained only by full information and contribution
limits." 31 They advocate an overall limit on the size of the exploratory fund,
and they limit contributions to the amount produced by dividing the fund
limit by the "minimum number of donors that will effectively reduce the
problem of special dealing."
32
B. Patriot
The authors pose and try to answer several questions about the design
of Patriot: "Who should get Patriot dollars? How many? Who may compete
to obtain them? Under what terms?" 33 The answers turn out to range from
relatively simple to quite complex. I will give a rather truncated summary,
but will not omit all the details since their very existence is an important
part of the reality that the new paradigm imagines.
Patriot dollars will not automatically land in every bank account.
Acquiring them, and learning how to use them, will take some effort on the
part of citizens who are eligible to receive them. To open a Patriot account,
a citizen must be a registered voter. Once registered to vote, a citizen may
open her Patriot account in a variety of ways: by transforming one of her
existing credit or ATM cards either when she registers or votes, or by using
the Internet, the mail, or a phone. Having activated her Patriot account in
Ackerman and Ayres's "brave new world,, 34 she would simply go to her
neighborhood ATM and vote her Patriot dollars. Three ground rules would
apply: She would have five days in which to change her mind; her
contribution would be anonymous; and, to use the ATM, she must have
linked her Patriot account to standard electronic cards.
35
Citizens may send their Patriot dollars to the candidate of their choice,
to political parties, or to what Ackerman and Ayres call "patriotic PACs"-
political action committees formed explicitly to solicit Patriot dollars and
that are required to contribute those dollars to candidates. Such PACs
31. Id. at 59.
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 66.
34. [d. at 69.
35. Id. at 67-69.
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would be forbidden to use Patriot dollars to finance their own speech.
Neither political parties nor patriotic PACs would be bound by the
anonymity requirement: The amount of their contributions and the
candidates to whom they donate would be periodically disclosed.
3 6
Ackerman and Ayres assume that the initial amount in each citizen's
Patriot account will be $50 and that that amount will then be divided into
subaccounts containing appropriate amounts for the open races in the
citizen's district: $10 for House races, $15 if there is a Senate race, and $25
for the presidential campaign.37 Citizens may transfer their House and
Senate Patriot dollars to candidates in races outside their own
constituencies, a provision that Ackerman and Ayres think will be of
particular value to citizens who find themselves in a permanent minority
within their own district and thus feel effectively disenfranchised.38 When
incumbent presidents run for reelection, the $25 in the presidential
subaccount would be further divided into, say, $10 for the primaries and
$15 for the general election. In order to avert a financial drought in the
early stages of the campaign, Ackerman and Ayres propose a bonus for
early givers: Until 5 percent of available Patriot dollars have reached the
candidates, every Patriot contribution will be doubled. The Federal Election
Commission (FEC) will "determine, in a fair and impartial way, when the 5
percent threshold has been reached and... declare the bonus period at an
end."
39
The initial decision to allocate $50 to every Patriot account is not the
only decision to be made with regard to the question of "how much?"
Ackerman and Ayres suggest giving the FEC authority to increase the
amount should either of two problems materialize. The first problem would
be that all campaigns find themselves starved for funds due to a decrease in
private giving coupled with relatively few citizens choosing to spend their
Patriots. To address this problem, the authors suggest granting the FEC
authority during the next presidential cycle to increase the Patriotic
allocation in order to insure that "overall funds flowing into the reformed
system are no less substantial than those flowing under the old regime.
Should the pool of campaign funds be less than fifty percent of the average
available at comparable stages of past campaigns, the authors reluctantly
suggest granting the FEC power to provide "a compensating bonus to every
36. Id. at 72-75.
37. Id. at 76.
38. Id. at 77-78. The authors do not explain how the ability to give S15 of taxpayer-provided
money to a candidate for a House seat in another district could give an individual a meaningfully
increased sense of political efficacy.
39. Id. at 83.
40. Id. at 86.
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candidate in proportion to the number of Patriot dollars that he or she has
collected. 4 1
The second problem would arise if the share of private contributions
equals or exceeds the share of patriotic contributions. "Whenever the share
of private contributions exceeds one-third of the whole, we consider this a
dangerous sign of incipient oligarchy. 4 2 Ackerman and Ayres propose
solving this problem, should it materialize, by granting the FEC the
authority to increase patriotic allocations so as to achieve a two-to-one
funding ratio.
C. The Donation Booth
Ackerman and Ayres describe the design of the secret donation booth in
some detail. The reconstituted FEC would establish a blind trust, to which
all contributors and allied organizations would be required to send all
contributions. On a separate form, the contributor would write the name of
the donee candidate or organization, each of which will have to open
accounts with the trust for receipt of designated donations. The aggregate
amount in each account would be reported daily on the Internet, but the
FEC would be required to keep secret the names of all contributors giving
more than $200. (The authors permit disclosure of the identities of givers of
up to $200 because "[t]he problem of special dealing arises only with big
gifts. '43) Candidates for office, as well as political parties and political
action committees that they control or influence, would be forbidden to
receive identifiable donations from any source except the trust. PACs no
longer could serve as intermediaries passing along bundles of contributions
from their members. Rigorous internal audits, coupled with the ability of
donors to verify their gifts, would check rogue bureaucrats' tendencies to
misapply donations to suit their own, rather than the donors', preferences.
Revolving-door employment bans, premium salaries, and prohibitions on
fraternization with candidates would help guarantee official integrity.4
The anonymity feature of the secret donation booth requires additional
safeguards. First, in order to prevent donors from showing candidates large
checks made out to the FEC's blind trust and thus credibly claiming to have
been generous contributors, Ackerman and Ayres would make the
environment "noisy [and] full of potentially misleading signals." 45 Donors
41. Id.
42. Id. at 89.
43. Id. at 96. They presumably regard $200 as the genuine threshold and view gifts of
anything more as raising the "problem of special dealing," although they never defend the amount
of this extremely low threshold.
44. Id. at 99-100.
45. Id. at 101.
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would have a five-day cooling-off period in which they could revoke their
gift; their gift checks would be cashed, and their revocation would be
honored by a reimbursement check from the FEC. Thus, no candidate could
be sure whether donors' gifts have been revoked, even if donors choose to
stage elaborate "ritual[s] of honor."4
6
In order to deter "check-bombing"-by which they mean the donation
of private contributions large enough to stand out 47 -Ackerman and Ayres
propose to secure donor anonymity further through an ingenious device
they call the "secrecy algorithm." In response to a sudden surge of large
donations, and relying on the algorithm, the trust would sequester some of
the donated money so that the candidate would not know of its existence
until later. The algorithm itself would be triggered only by a small number
of large gifts (rather than by a large number of small ones). And it would
aggregate an individual's past contributions and "deter[] gamesmanship by
making randomization a function of dollar amounts that are not precisely
knowable by either the candidates or contributors.,
48
Ackerman and Ayres appear convinced that both Patriot and the secret
donation booth are reforms that could conceivably be enacted, and they
suggest that these are ideas whose time may have come. In support, they
cite the fact that judicial candidates in sixteen states are prohibited from
learning who has donated to their election campaigns. 49 And they note that
in South Korea that fountainhead of modem democracy-donors have the
option of contributing anonymously (although they fail to note the
important fact that they are not required to do so), that Chile is considering
making anonymity a requirement, and that the Conservative Party in Britain
has proposed discussing the establishment of a blind trust. And they assert
that "[iln conjunction with patriotic finance, [the donation booth] promises
a genuine democratic breakthrough."' 0
The secret donation booth's promise cannot be fulfilled, however, if
"big givers simply undertake their own independent media campaigns on
behalf of their favorite causes. ' Thus, in chapter 8, Ackerman and Ayres
describe a series of regulations and FEC strategies that will "plug the gaps."
Continuing to claim that "[c]ommand-and-control regulation is our last
resort,, 52 they nevertheless anticipate and propose methods to forestall big-
46. Id. at 103.
47. Id. at 104-05.
48. Id. at 106.
49. Id. at 109. The constitutionality of this prohibition is in some doubt after Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding unconstitutional the "announce clause"
of Minnesota's Code of Judicial Ethics, which prohibited judicial candidates from announcing
their views on disputed legal and political issues).
50. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 109.
51. Id. at 111.
52. Id. at 112,
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giver attempts to evade the secrecy algorithm and "gain special influence"
by running "their own independent issue advocacy campaigns on behalf of"
their favorite candidates.53 For the former, they propose limits on individual
giving during any particular accounting period and overall limits on the
amount that any donor can give to all campaigns, political committees, and
express advocacy groups during any calendar year. 54 They also suggest
granting the FEC power to modify the limits "as it gains more experience in
evaluating the variability of private contributions under the new
paradigm. ' 55 Turning to the express advocacy problem, they grudgingly
acknowledge that "[s]hort of the abolition of free markets and private
property, there is simply no way to eliminate the influence of private money
on democratic politics. 5 6 But to reduce what remains of this pernicious
influence after Patriot and the secret donation booth take effect, they
propose both a "stabilization algorithm" to "assure that at least two-thirds
of total funds come from patriotic sources,"57 and a set of regulations to
assure that only organizations truly independent of candidates may receive
donations for issue advocacy. They "treat[] all political parties as their
candidates' alter egos," 58 and they permit only PACs that do not solicit
Patriot dollars to raise private funds outside the secret donation booth.
In a chapter entitled "Safeguarding the Guardians," Ackerman and
Ayres turn to what they regard as the "key pressure point"5 9 for their new
paradigm-the FEC. Looking for commissioners who will be "men and
women whose interests and ambitions will lead them to resist the
temptation to turn a blind eye to illegalities perpetrated by powerful donors
and candidates," 60 who will "have also been socialized into the cast of mind
necessary for the successful operation of the FEC-cultivating habits of
impartiality in the name of the rule of law, 61 and who will be nonpartisan
and decisive, they propose that the FEC be made up of retired federal
judges. They propose a five-member Commission, nominated by the
President and confirmed for staggered ten-year terms. They would give sole
authority to appoint the agency's key bureau chiefs to the Commission in
order to provide a "buffer against political pressures." 62 One bureau chief
would be charged "with the task of managing Patriot, one with operating
the donation booth, one with law enforcement." 63 Enforcement would be
53. Id. at 118-19.
54. Id. at 116-18.
55. Id. at 116.
56. Id. at 120.
57. Id. at 121.
58. Id. at 124.
59. Id. at 128.
60. Id. at 129.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 131.
63. Id. at 132.
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separate from the operating divisions; the head of enforcement would serve
as general counsel, with full independence to investigate but no power to
indict without the attorney general's review. Fearing a "[b]udgetary
[c]ounterattack" 64 from Congress, and worrying that the threat of such
attack would be exacerbated by Congress's opaque budgetary processes,
they recommend insulating the agency's budget-both Patriot and
operating-from annual congressional review. The insulation and
reconstruction of the FEC make it possible, according to Ackerman and
Ayres, to "eliminate almost all command and control and
reserve.., criminal sanctions to a few simple requirements: Don't bribe
Patriot holders. Don't accept any cash or checks from anybody-tell them
to send it to you via the secret donation booth., 65 In order to make sure that
groups claiming to be devoted to independent advocacy do not sabotage the
donation booth by letting themselves be secretly controlled by candidates'
campaigns, the authors provide for penal sanctions if the general counsel
becomes convinced that sham organizations have proliferated "to the point
at which they threaten the integrity of the donation booth. 66
The book's penultimate chapter subjects the new paradigm to
constitutional scrutiny. Perhaps not surprisingly, Ackerman and Ayres
discover that their "model statute conforms in all respects to prevailing
judicial doctrine, '67 and, in particular, that it conforms to what they discern
to be "Buckley's twin principles-against expenditure ceilings, for public
subsidies." 68 Beginning their constitutional analysis with Patriot, they
pursue the implications of the fact that the Buckley Court sustained the
granting of subsidies for presidential candidates who waive their right to
receive public funds. They read this aspect of the Buckley opinion for all-
and more than-it is worth, claiming that it shows the Court to be
"remarkably accommodating where governmental subsidies are
concerned,, 69 and even as having "suggest[ed] that serious campaign
reform should not happen without a significant injection of public funds." 70
They regard the waiver technique that the Court upheld in Buckley as a
powerful weapon in the fight to curb plutocracy. 71 They view Patriot as
having the benign effect of making it "dangerous for an ambitious plutocrat
64. Id. at 134.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Id. at 138.
67. Id. at 141.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. at 142.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 142-43 ("The Buckley opinion expressly authorizes Congress to offer plutocrats a
deal: The government will give them subsidies provided that they waive their right to spend freely
from their bottomless bank accounts.").
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to remain outside the subsidy program. '2 They insist that their model
statute
organizes the waiver transaction in precisely the same way as the
presidential subsidy program upheld in Buckley.... The only
difference is how the subsidy program structures [a candidate's]
choice: While the existing system gives candidates a fixed amount
of subsidy, the new paradigm makes the total subsidy depend on
the candidate's success in appealing to Patriot holders."
And they insist that this difference is constitutionally irrelevant.
Ackerman and Ayres then move to the two "constitutional issues raised
by [their] new approach to private giving,"74 namely, its threats to free
speech and freedom of association. Regarding free speech, the authors note
that the Court's "fierce... resistance" 75 to restrictions on campaign
contributions and expenditures has consistently yielded to measures that
"can plausibly be viewed as efforts to reduce the risk--or even the
appearance-of corruption. ' ' 16 Implicitly collapsing any distinction that
might be thought to exist between quid pro quo corruption-the prevention
of which the Court permitted in Buckley-and more nebulous exchanges of
contributions for access or influence, the authors claim that their "approach
to private giving is carefully tailored to eliminate only those donations that
generate the possibility of influence peddling."77 (When this assertion is put
together with the imposition of anonymity on any contributor donating
more than $200, the authors must be taken to claim that all contributions of
more than $200 generate the possibility of influence peddling.) Moreover,
they claim, since their scheme permits every American to say whatever she
wants about how much she has donated and to whom, it does "not in any
way trench upon the donor's freedom of speech. 78 Although the
requirement that all donations be funneled through the donation booth
certainly disrupts communication between candidates, their supporters, and
the public, the authors conclude that it is justified by the statute's
subordination of "each individual's right to privacy, and to the national
interest in maximizing voluntary participation"-not "voluntary"
participation in the voting booth, but "voluntary" participation in the pure
72. Id. at 144. The word "plutocrat" in this sentence refers to individuals who would finance
their campaigns from a combination of their own money and funds raised through private
contributions.
73. Id. at 146.




78. Id. at 148-50.
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act of giving.79 They never explain how any individual's "right to privacy"
can be served by a requirement not to speak. Finally, the authors claim that,
by analogy to New York Times v. Sullivan,80 their plan tolerates and
encourages lies in order to use "free speech as a tool for controlling
corruption. By allowing small donors to exaggerate, we undermine the
capacity of big donors to obtain special influence. 81
The authors acknowledge that certain features of their scheme may also
trench upon freedom of association: The requirement that each donor
personally send his own money to the blind trust and the rule prohibiting
groups from creating PACs to contribute money directly to candidates both
raise such concerns. But both restrictions, they conclude, are legitimate
anticorruption measures. The latter, moreover, represents a smaller loss to
the freedom of association than at first appears: Groups remain free to
collect and spend in their own name on the issues of the day, and they
remain free to establish patriotic PACs, the amount of whose gifts to
candidates will be made public. Should any doubts on the freedom-of-
association front remain, Ackerman and Ayres once again invoke the secret
ballot analogy-and they do so in their characteristic rhetorical style:
Indeed, the threat of corruption is even greater in the case of
nonanonymous donations. Vote-buying is perforce a retail
operation, but a single instance of financial corruption can affect
the entire election-with a candidate selling his position in
exchange for big contributions that can be turned into thousands of
votes through aggressive advertising campaigns. If the secret ballot
is constitutional-and who would claim otherwise?-so is the
donation booth. 2
In their final chapter, Ackerman and Ayres venture a number of
predictions about how their "proposal would actually change the concrete
terms of American politics." 83 Describing the spirit of their approach as one
of "realistic idealism, ' '84 and professing to have "staked [a] claim to real-
world attention by brandishing a host of shiny technocratic tools, '8 5 they
say their aim is "to revive the great American tradition of popular
sovereignty against the very real threats posed to its survival., 86 They
describe the challenge as enabling
79. id. at 148-49.
80. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
81. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 150.
82. Id. at 154.
83. Id. at 161.
84. Id. at 160.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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twenty-first century people to build new forms of citizenship out of
the ordinary materials of modem life-and from this perspective,
there is no better place to look than the neighborhood ATM. By
voting with their dollars, each American will be killing two birds
with one flick of the credit card. Symbolically, he will be
reaffirming his own commitment to citizenship-taking the time
and trouble to pick out the candidates and groups that best represent
his hopes for America. Practically, he will be contributing to a flow
of citizen choices that will overwhelm the national drift to
oligarchy. Merging symbol with practical power, he will be doing
his bit to carve out a special space for democratic citizenship-in
which ordinary people confront one another as equals as they
hammer out the basic terms of their ongoing social contract.
87
Ackerman and Ayres's more concrete predictions begin with a thought
experiment that replays the 2000 election with Patriot dollars and the secret
donation booth. By a process of reasoning that is nothing if not surreal, they
conclude that Elizabeth Dole would have been elected President. They then
turn their attention to predictions about losers and winners under the new
paradigm. They first address the "big losers-the political interests that
currently push their agendas with large private contributions," which they
then identify as "corporate America.""8 Special dealing with big business,
the authors predict, will become rarer. As a consequence, there will be less
"pork of a certain kind, in which a concentrated group of industrial
producers use state power to exploit a large group of unorganized
consumers." 89 They predict that the substantial dollar savings on this kind
of pork could well exceed the costs of funding Patriot. They acknowledge,
however, that a different kind of pork will be common. "Rather than
pushing projects that reward a few big private givers, congressmen will
look for those that could generate lots of patriotic cash from ordinary
constituents. This means more neighborhood centers for the masses, fewer
irrigation projects for desert agriculture." 90
The winners under the new paradigm are harder to predict. In general,
they will consist of individuals and groups who are effective in the
competition for Patriot dollars. Sociological and ideological interest groups
and political parties will be the main contenders, but the authors concede
that there is no way to foresee which of them will prevail from time to time:
"The game isn't obviously biased in favor of liberals or conservatives.'
91
Nevertheless, Ackerman and Ayres anticipate that
87. Id. at 161.
88. Id. at 171.
89. Id. at 172.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 175.
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the new paradigm [will] open[] up new possibilities for serious
debate on issues of social justice. With corporate dominance
removed and Patriot dollars diffused broadly, liberals have a chance
to raise the question of economic equality with new seriousness. It
is up to them to come up with a serious program that might
persuade a skeptical public.
The authors concede that "hard-edged predictions are impossible, 93 which
suggests that the important feature of the new paradigm is not that it
purports to manipulate the future but rather that it "provides a flexible
response to changing public views of the public agenda" 94 and will place
"ordinary Americans firmly in the driver's seat."95
Finally, the book contains a forty-page model statute, along with four
appendices that describe the stabilization and secrecy algorithms, explain
how the regulations of last resort were designed, and calculate the total
annual costs of operating the new paradigm.
PART II
A. The Diagnosis
Ackerman and Ayres claim that their new paradigm for campaign
finance will cure what ails American democracy. That claim rests on the
two premises that constitute their diagnosis, namely, that American
democracy is sick, and that "big money" is what ails it. They expend
surprisingly little intellectual energy either defending their diagnosis or
articulating the assumptions upon which they base it. Instead, they
concentrate on designing a foolproof method for administering the cure.
It is their diagnosis, however, that raises the truly significant issues. My
principal thesis in this Review is that the authors' diagnosis is off the mark.
It goes astray because it is fundamentally incomplete. To the extent that its
empirical claims can be discerned through the rhetorical fog that obscures
them, many are questionable and some are plainly inaccurate. And to the
extent that it represents not a descriptive account of our democracy but a
normative one, its theoretical underpinnings remain unspecified.
Begin with the "standard reconciliation," which anchors the authors'
claim that "big money" is what ails American democracy. It turns out to be
a useless construct. It is so pat that one might think it nothing more than a
stray bit of rhetorical overkill but for the fact that the authors deploy it as
92. Id. at 176.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 177.
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the cornerstone of their analysis. Reasoning from the standard
reconciliation is what leads Ackerman and Ayres to their conclusion that
"[b]ig money is the problem," 96 but it does so only by suppressing realities
and questions that surely would have warranted a more nuanced, less
confidently categorical judgment. Acknowledging the realities they
suppress and raising the questions they leave unasked would have rendered
their analysis more complete and might even have led them to challenge
their glib conclusion that big money is the problem.
Ackerman and Ayres claim that the standard reconciliation
is a straightforward two-step argument. Step one begins by
conceding that the single-minded pursuit of self-interest may
generate pervasive inequalities and inefficiencies. But if these
prove unacceptable, we can always move to step two: It's our job
as citizens to deliberate together and take corrective action-
redistributing wealth from rich to poor and taking regulatory
actions when markets fail.
97
"Democratic citizens," they continue,
can alter economic outcomes whenever they find them seriously
deviating from their ideals of social justice....
... [But] big money threatens to undermine the standard
reconciliation.
The problem is obvious. If the deliberations of democratic
citizens are crucial in the legitimation of market inequality, we
cannot allow market inequalities to have an overwhelming impact
on these deliberations. If this happens, we can no longer say that
we, as citizens, have authorized the pervasive inequalities that we
experience as market actors. Politics will have been transformed
into a forum in which big money praises itself.
... [Therefore, t]he insulation of democratic politics from the
rule of big money is, under the standard reconciliation, a necessary
condition for the legitimation of big money in the marketplace
itself.98
The standard reconciliation clearly embodies a normative political
theory, although the authors do not spell it out. Instead, they defend it with
what they portray as a realistic account of how democracy could actually
96. Id. at 14.
97. Id. at 12.
98. id. at 12-13.
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work if only it worked as it should. As a description of what would actually
be required in the real world to reconcile "liberal markets with democratic
equality," 99 however, their defense is deficient on a number of grounds.
First, the fact that "single-minded pursuit of self-interest [by market actors
in the private sector] may generate pervasive inequalities and
inefficiencies" is only half the story. The no less important other half is that
citizens acting collectively in single-minded pursuit of the public interest
may also generate inequalities and inefficiencies with the programs they
enact. The standard reconciliation implies that the move from step one to
step two is a "straightforward" one that will eliminate inequalities and
inefficiencies. Instead, the move will merely rearrange and redistribute
inequalities and inefficiencies; there is no warrant in the actual experience
of any country in the world for thinking that it will eliminate them. Only a
fraction of the genuinely hard task of resolving the democratic dilemma,
therefore, can be accomplished by identifying the inequities and
inefficiencies that the private sector pursuit of private interest generates.
One must also try to predict the inequities and inefficiencies that corrective
collective action is likely to produce and then try to discern what steps to
take should these, in their turn, "prove unacceptable." And one must
compare the costs and benefits of private and public sector inequities and
inefficiencies, and prescribe a move from one to another only if a net social
gain can realistically be anticipated. 100 Ackerman and Ayres's analysis fails
to grapple with any of these genuinely difficult issues.
A second troubling feature of the standard reconciliation is its
implication that market actors pursue their selfish aims with relentless
single-mindedness and that they are uniquely self-interested, while citizens
deliberating together to "take corrective action to redistribute wealth and
correct market failure" are acting in genuine pursuit not of their own self-
interest but rather of the broader public good. This implication is
troublesome for two reasons. To begin with, it assumes that there is in fact a
99. Id. at 12.
100. GORDON TULLOCK ET AL., GOVERNMENT FAILURE: A PRIMER IN PUBLIC CHOICE 11-12
(2002) ("The view that government is the automatic perfect solution to innumerable problems no
longer exists .... Today, we start from the knowledge that the government also does not function
perfectly and then make a selection between two imperfect operational devices in terms of their
relative perfection ...."). Note also that the comparison between inequities and inefficiencies
must be made regarding a move in either direction, from private to public or vice versa. "[T]hat
the government performs certain functions poorly does not, in and of itself, prove that the market
would do better." Id. at 12. This is because unintended consequences, whether happily benign or
unhappily inefficient, tend to emerge whenever purposive collective action is taken, whether the
move is from private to public or from public to private. See generally STEVEN M. GILLON,
"THAT'S NOT WHAT WE MEANT TO Do": REFORM AND ITS UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000) (recounting several instances in which unintended
consequences resulted from purposeful collective action).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1153
The Yale Law Journal
"broader public good" about which people of goodwill can agree.10' But
that assumption is questionable if individuals of goodwill have different
conceptions of what the broader public good requires because no system
has yet been identified by which to aggregate the differing conceptions of
many individuals into collective decisions. 0 2 In addition, the implication
assumes that selfish pursuit of their own narrow interests is the sole
province of actors with "big money," while advocates for public-sector
redistribution and regulatory programs are reliably unselfish and motivated
by high-minded, genuinely public-regarding impulses. 103 It is far more
plausible, however, that self-interest and virtue are possessed in equal
degree by private and public actors, by those with money and those who
wish to redistribute it, and by those who resist regulation and those who
would impose it.104 More likely still, alas, is that self-interest dominates
everywhere. 0 5 Failure even to consider this possibility permits the authors
to proceed as though the dichotomy they posit-between bad, self-
interested people on the one hand and good, publicly interested citizens on
the other-is descriptively accurate. This in turn permits them to demonize
those whom they characterize as self-interested while putting other actors-
101. The standard reconciliation appears implicitly to posit something like the public-interest
model of politics as if it were a reality rather than an aspiration. The public-interest model
depends
at bottom on a belief in the reality-or at least the possibility-of public or objective
values and ends for human action. In this public-interest model the legislature is
regarded as a forum for identifying or defining and acting towards those ends. The
process is one of mutual search through joint deliberation, relying on the use of reason
supposed to have persuasive force. Majority rule is experienced as the natural way of
taking action as and for a group-or as a device for filtering the reasonable from the
unreasonable, the persuasive from the unpersuasive, the right from the wrong, and the
good from the bad. Moral insight, sociological understanding, and goodwill are all
legislative virtues.
Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Seif-Determination: Competing Judicial
Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977-1978) (citations omitted).
102. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-6, 59-60, 89 (2d
ed. 1963).
103. This assumption is embedded in the standard reconciliation, although Ackerman and
Ayres themselves do not in fact seem genuinely to believe it. For example, when offering
predictions about how the new paradigm will affect politics in the future, they clearly envision
politicians acting in pursuit of personal political gain making appeals for Patriot dollars in terms
of their constituents' selfish desires that federal money be spent in their districts: "Rather than
pushing projects that reward a few big private givers, congressmen will look for those that could
generate lots of patriotic cash from ordinary constituents. This means more neighborhood centers
for the masses .... " ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 172.
104. This, of course, is the premise of Buchanan and Tullock's seminal work in the public-
choice tradition. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT:
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
105. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice
Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1330 (1994) ("People care more about themselves than
about others.... [S]elf-love dominates even when people know intellectually that virtuous
conduct would be better. When the conflict between self and virtue is irreconcilable, cognitive
dissonance leads people to conclude that civic virtue and personal ends coincide.").
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ordinary citizens--on something of a pedestal of virtue.'0 6 Acknowledging
that self-interest probably prods all actors in the political system-those in
the public sector as well as those in the private one-would, at the very
least, have enriched Ackerman and Ayres's analysis. It might have saved
them, for example, from viewing the potential for Patriot dollars to entice
citizens into active engagement through such rose-colored glasses. 0 7 And it
might have caused them to be less inclined to regard big, privately
contributed money as the sole source of perverse special-interest influence
in the legislative process. Ideological interest groups, with their
passionately embraced but narrow agendas, have no monopoly on political
virtue-nor do corporate interests have an exclusive claim to political vice.
The standard reconciliation is also troubling because it suggests that,
were it not for big-money special interests, it would be easy, costless, and
uncomplicated to take collective action-a mere matter of "redistributing
wealth from rich to poor and taking regulatory actions when markets
fail." 108 Ackerman and Ayres imply that with the stroke of a legislative pen,
citizens acting collectively could "alter economic outcomes whenever they
find them seriously deviating from their ideals of social justice."'0 19 This
glib assertion shoves under the rug the stubborn and disagreeable fact that
designing and implementing redistributive programs that generate more
benign than perverse consequences for their intended beneficiaries and for
their benefactors presents a daunting challenge. 110 Getting rid of "big
money" will certainly transform the way the politics of redistribution plays
out, but it will not make it any easier to craft workable or effective
redistributive policies.' The system of campaign finance that prevails at
106. Cf David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance Reform, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1369, 1378 (1994) ("One side's chief examples of narrow and self-interested groups will
be the other side's examples of groups that pursue the public interest.").
107. See infra Section II.B.
108. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 12.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. See Cass Sunstein, Cash and Citizenship, NEW REPUBLIC, May 24, 1999, at 42
(reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTr, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999) and
criticizing Ackerman and Alstott's plan to grant $80,000 to each high school graduate because of
its likely perverse effects on the intended beneficiaries and the more general, and very high, risk
of unintended bad consequences); see also FINIS WELCH, MINIMUM WAGES: ISSUES AND
EVIDENCE 34-38 (1978) (providing evidence that minimum wage laws reduce employment).
11. Ackerman and Ayres insist:
[T]he new paradigm opens up new possibilities for serious debate on issues of social
justice. With corporate dominance removed and Patriot dollars diffused broadly,
liberals have a chance to raise the question of economic equality with new seriousness.
It is up to them to come up with a serious program that might persuade a skeptical
public. If they fail, they will have nobody to blame but themselves.
ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 176 (footnote omitted). They do not recount the facts from
which they infer that there is a genuine need for "new possibilities for serious debate." Id. Nor
could they readily do so because debate on issues of social justice-what it consists of, how to
achieve it-is a constant of our politics. One cannot avoid the suspicion that what prompts their
anxiety is not the absence of debate but the fact that their particular views of social justice have
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any time has no bearing whatsoever on the complex problem of designing
redistributive mechanisms whose consequences are likely to be on balance
socially beneficial. It is perhaps conceivable that the design problem will
not prove ultimately intractable, but experience to date has proven it highly
resistant to satisfactory solution.' 12 Moreover, many of the regulatory
actions that we so far have taken to cure market failures have not exactly
turned out to be unqualified remedies, and their implementation has
frequently exposed serious systemic flaws in the regulatory regimes under
which they operate. 1
13
A final troublesome aspect of the standard reconciliation is its
implication, stemming from its conclusion that "big money" is the problem,
that the political influence of moneyed interests can be neutralized simply
by enacting the right set of campaign finance reforms. The authors seem to
assume that the only important way that big-money interests use their
financial resources to acquire political influence is through campaign
contributions, and that when these interests can no longer gain access and
influence by making such contributions, they no longer will have any
incentive to play the political game. 114 The assumption is questionable.
Significant evidence exists that corporations, whose influence Ackerman
and Ayres are at such pains to dilute, already spend fewer resources on
campaign contributions than on other means of achieving access and
not gained much of a foothold among the ordinary Americans they (claim to) aspire to persuade.
The more important point in the present context, however, is that if liberals have not yet come up
with a "serious program that might persuade a skeptical public," id., their failure can hardly be
attributed to the absence of opportunities for serious debate. It is far more likely to be the result of
the genuine difficulty of coming up with promising new ideas. In fact, it may well be that
achieving social justice is a considerably harder task than Ackerman and Ayres imply since the
promise of justice through collective action cannot be redeemed without paying a heavy price in
prosperity and freedom-and perhaps not even then.
112. See, e.g., HEATHER MACDONALD, THE BURDEN OF BAD IDEAS: How MODERN
INTELLECTUALS MISSHAPE OUR SOCIETY 155-208 (2000) (describing several public welfare
efforts and concluding that they have failed because of flaws in their conception); see also
GILLON, supra note 100, at 43-119 (describing the unfortunate unintended consequences of
federal welfare policy since 1935 and of the Community Mental Health Act of 1963).
113. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T, HASSLER, CLEAN COALIDIRTY AIR: OR
How THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981); see also Richard B. Stewart,
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV.
1256, 1297-301 (1981) (suggesting that stringent regulation of new sources of air pollution
perpetuates the life of old, dirty sources, thereby aggravating rather than alleviating air pollution)-
114. If Ackerman and Ayres did not assume this, they would not claim that getting rid of the
influence of large private campaign donors would have the impact that they predict for it. They do
acknowledge at one point the existence of other "channels of political influence," ACKERMAN &
AYRES, supra note 3, at 32, but the context of the acknowledgment suggests that they do not
regard the alternatives as either important or particularly robust. They imply that the alternative
channels are less effective than campaign contributions, that moneyed interests do not use them as
much now as they use contributions, and that therefore one need not worry about them. They
neglect to account for the likelihood that once they lose the ability to use their big money to make
campaign contributions, the big-money people will substitute into these alternative channels of
influence.
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affecting the political agenda.115 Getting rid of corporate campaign
contributions will not diminish these efforts and doing so in fact seems
likely to increase the amount of corporate resources devoted to them. In
addition, given the pervasiveness of government and the increasingly high
stakes at risk in the political game," 6 moneyed interests will continue to
have incentives to acquire and retain political clout. In short, the incentives
for those with wealth to attempt to wield political influence, in contrast to
their incentives to devise means of evading contribution limitations, will
remain undiminished by the secret donation booth even if it is perfectly
successful (on its own terms) at eliminating private money as an important
factor in the financing of political campaigns. Indeed, if the new paradigm
works as Ackerman and Ayres clearly hope it will-by creating popular
pressure for massive redistribution-the incentives for the wealthy to
remain players in the political game are likely to intensify rather than to
diminish.
Because it ignores so many relevant alternative descriptions of political
reality, and because it so grossly oversimplifies the task of collectively
devising and effectuating workable policies, the "standard reconciliation"
that provides the cornerstone for Ackerman and Ayres's "new paradigm" is
an illusion. And because it is an illusion, it provides no genuine support for
their claim that what ails democracy-and, in particular, what stands in the
way of mobilizing citizen support for collectively enacted redistribution-
is, purely and simply, "big money."
B. The Cure: Patriot
For the moment, let us assume arguendo that Ackerman and Ayres's
standard reconciliation works in principle-that inequalities and
inefficiencies are uniquely characteristic of private markets, and that
collective action to redistribute wealth and generally to alter economic
outcomes would proceed in a manner less encumbered by inefficiencies and
inequities if we could insulate political campaigns from the influence of
large private contributions. This questionable assumption enables us to
assess how likely it is that the new paradigm could achieve its goal.
115. See Jeffrey Milyo et al., Corporate PAC Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS.
& POL. 75, 83-84 (2000) (finding that lobbying expenditures were substantially greater than
money spent by PACs in campaigns, and that charitable giving by corporations exceeded either
kind of spending).
116. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., A SIMPLE EXPLANATION FOR WHY CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURES
ARE INCREASING: THE GOVERNMENT IS GETTING BIGGER (Univ. of Chi., Law & Econ. Working
Paper No. 52 (2d ser.), 1998) (arguing that recent increases in campaign spending can be
explained by higher government spending, and that because it focuses on the symptoms and not
the causes of increased spending, the current debate risks changing the form of payments without
restricting the amount).
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Ackerman and Ayres tout Patriot's ability to achieve the noble
objective of making politics "more responsive to the judgments of equal
citizens."' 1 7 Patriot reflects their "aim to revive the great American tradition
of popular sovereignty against the very real threats posed to its survival."' 18
Although they claim that the "ideal of popular sovereignty runs deep in our
history,"" 9 they neither offer evidence to support the assertion nor define
what they denote by the term. If popular sovereignty means that the right to
vote is broadly distributed, then the "tradition" is more alive today than
ever before. And if popular sovereignty means direct democracy, then the
claim that the ideal runs deep in our history would be difficult to support.
The Constitution as originally enacted did not reflect a commitment to
popular sovereignty in either of these two senses. Each of the original
thirteen states severely limited the right to vote, and the Constitution
assumed the validity of the provisions of the respective states' election
laws. In its own terms, the Constitution dealt with voting in only one
provision, and then not to confer the franchise but simply to require that the
electors for the House in each state be the same as those for the more
numerous branch of the state legislature.120 Even more importantly, the
Constitution created a democratic republic, a government by elected
representatives and not by direct citizen participation. And it embodied an
institutional design whose structure was carefully tailored to check and
balance the potential excesses of national power and majoritarianism.121
Judging from the contexts in which they use the term, however, it
would seem that Ackerman and Ayres use "popular sovereignty" more to
adumbrate an appealing image than to denote a specific phenomenon such
as the right to vote or direct democracy. They seem to be referring to a
situation in which "the people" as a whole-meaning, presumably, the
individuals who comprise the people, qua individuals set the political
agenda, determine the content of political outcomes, and effectively
monitor the behavior of their representatives. 122 But if this is a fair
characterization of what they mean by popular sovereignty, it is fair in turn
to ask them to provide support for the claim that it is either a "great
117. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 14.
118. Id. at 160.
119. Id.
120. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 1.
121. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(identifying a republican form of government, rather than a direct democracy, as the best "cure for
the mischiefs of faction"); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra, at 348 (James Madison)
(arguing that different constituencies ought to be represented in the various branches of the federal
government, and that doing so would provide incentives for the branches to "keep[] each other in
their proper places").
122. They seem also to be implying that at present "the people" are systematically thwarted
in the achievement of their preferred political outcomes. With "popular sovereignty," their true
desires would presumably emerge and be enacted.
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tradition" or that it is a broadly embraced ideal that "runs deep in our
history."
Despite waves of populism that have occasionally engulfed political
debate, the political agenda has always been set not directly by "the people"
but rather by a broad array of mediating institutions, from organized groups
pursuing common agendas (i.e., special-interest groups) to political parties
to the press. This is not surprising. The task of monitoring the behavior of
representatives is beset with collective action problems, problems that
become increasingly severe as government takes on more and more
projects. In the face of these problems, individual citizens have always had
to rely on competing interest groups and the press to do most of the
monitoring for them. 12 3 In addition, political outcomes have never been
determined directly by what a majority of the people want at any point in
time. At the very least, it is a widely held premise of political scientists that
it is a naive mistake to speak of a democracy as if it involved rule
by a single, well-defined majority over a coherent and constant
minority. Instead, normal American politics is pluralistic: myriad
pressure groups, each typically representing a faction of the
population, bargain with one another for mutual support. 
24
In addition to the imprecision of the meaning of "citizen sovereignty,"
there is reason to be skeptical about Patriot's ability to make politics
genuinely "more responsive to the judgments of equal citizens." Perhaps
citizen alienation from contemporary American politics can be attributed in
part, as Ackerman and Ayres seem to attribute most of it, to the role of big
money. However, the extent to which politics is not responsive to the
judgment of ordinary citizens is probably more a function of the fact that,
for plausible systemic reasons, ordinary citizens are not responsive to
politics. 125 Consider that a well-functioning representative democracy
requires that ordinary citizens know and understand the implications of
what their elected representatives are doing. Otherwise they will not be able
to hold them to account, and politicians will be systematically less
"responsive to [citizens'] judgment" than they would be if citizens were
reliably knowledgeable. Whenever government officials know more about
what government is doing than its citizens-which is bound to be
123. See Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1627 (1999) (arguing that because most voters are insufficiently engaged to be active
principals who carefully monitor the actions of their representative-agents, they are more
accurately viewed as consumers of political products produced by others, especially political
parties, and analyzing the problems that political intermediaries pose, such as superagency costs
and rent-seeking).
124. Bruce A. Ackerman, BeyondCarotene Products, 98 HARV. L. RFV. 713, 719-20 (1985).
125. See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 260-76
(1957).
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practically all of the time-the officials have systematic opportunities to
shirk their obligations to their citizen-principals while pursuing interests of
their own (or of some special-interest group). 12 6
Unfortunately, though, individual citizens have many temptations to
free-ride on the information-acquiring efforts and responsible voting of
others: The policies of the government that voters elect will provide
benefits and create burdens that will accrue to citizens without regard to
whether they know what their government is doing and whether or not they
vote. 2 7 In addition, it is costly to vote. Indeed, if voting is considered solely
as an act whose aim is to affect the outcome of an election, it is an act with
a negative expected value since the chance that anyone's vote will affect the
outcome approaches zero. 128 Consider, then, how individual citizens might
behave if they were rational maximizers of their own satisfactions, and, in
this light, take account of their incentives as individuals to become
politically knowledgeable, engaged, and active.' 29 From this perspective,
individual citizens' ignorance of, and lack of response to, political issues
and candidate positions are to be expected. In fact, as a descriptive rather
than as a normative matter, these behaviors are rational, or at least
understandable, responses to the extremely low probability that any single
citizen's vote (or her failure to vote) will make a difference.
Likewise, even with the benefit of Patriot dollars, it would seem
rational for an individual citizen to remain disengaged when her Patriot-
amplified voice will amount only to one fifty-dollar contribution, spread
across three races, out of a total of three billion dollars. Ackerman and
Ayres fail to explain why citizens might behave differently when everyone
126. Gary C. Jacobsen, Campaign Finance and Democratic Control: Comments on Gottlieb
and Lowenstein's Papers, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 369, 369-70 (1989) (arguing that the debate over
campaign finance reform must take account of the fact that citizens and their representatives have
divergent interests and asymmetrical information, which exacerbates the challenges confronting
citizen monitoring).
127. See Easterbrook, supra note 105, at 1336 ("People who could influence legislators, if
they tried, need a good reason to try. If other persons similarly situated will do the job, any
particular member of the group can sit on the sidelines and reap the benefits without incurring the
costs.").
128. As Dennis Mueller has argued:
When two candidates compete for the votes of a large electorate, each individual's vote
has a negligible probability of affecting the outcome. Realizing this, rational voters do
not expend time and money gathering information about candidates. They remain
"rationally ignorant" of both the issues in the election and the opposing candidates'
positions on the issues.
DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 11, at 205-06 (1989).
129. In fact, Ackerman and Ayres pay shockingly little heed to the question of whether or not
citizens will be informed when they vote their Patriot dollars, nor do they address the very
important question of whether it matters if they are. For a thoughtful analysis of the tension
created by the fact that there is a trade-off between the expansion of the franchise and the quality
of individual political engagement, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The Paradox of Mass Democracy, in
RETHINKING THE VOTE: THE POLITICS AND PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN ELECTION REFORM (Ann
N. Crigler et al. eds., forthcoming 2004).
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has Patriot dollars from the way that they behave when everyone has a
single vote to spend. The chance that any single individual's Patriot dollars
will provide any candidate or cause with the margin of victory, or even that
those dollars will supply any candidate with a substantially increased
probability of election, would be as discouragingly slim as the chance that
her vote would affect the outcome of any election. Moreover, learning how
to make use of their Patriot dollars will not be costless for citizens.
Ackerman and Ayres disguise this fact by linking Patriot to "your local
ATM" and suggesting that pretty much everyone knows how to use those.
The fact remains that activating a Patriot account, learning how to deploy
Patriot dollars, and deciding how to spend them will require citizens to
spend time and effort. Recent experience with ballots in Florida does not
permit one to be confident that citizens will readily master Patriot's
intricacies. 130 Moreover, given that the appropriable benefits of the effort to
learn how Patriot works will approach zero for the citizens who rationally
calculate the effect their particular Patriots will have, it is probably a
mistake to think that many of them will invest in making it. The point is
this: Take big money out of the system. Put Patriot dollars in. The systemic
problems created by rational voter ignorance and the lack of powerful
individual incentives to vote-much less to become actively engaged in
politics-will continue to bedevil and to impoverish democratic dialogue.
Of course, if Patriot dollars were available, not every citizen would
react to the small odds of having any genuine impact on an election by
being or remaining disengaged. Even without Patriot, many citizens defy
the economists' dreary predictions by incurring the real personal costs of
becoming politically informed and remaining politically engaged. But who
needs Patriot for these citizens? Judging by their actions, they believe
themselves to be empowered despite big money. Many citizens neither vote
nor become informed, however, and it is those whom Patriot seems
designed to entice into active participation. Patriot must redirect the
systemic and arguably rational inclinations of the presently uninvolved and
uninformed citizens if it is to work as advertised to generate significantly
increased citizen political engagement. Yet in making their case for Patriot,
Ackerman and Ayres do not come to terms with the possibility that the
inclinations of citizens to remain disengaged might be systemic artifacts of
the intractable collective action problem that modem representative
government confronts, a problem whose enormity is exacerbated by the size
of the voting population and the complexity of the issues that face the
nation. Patriot is not likely to affect the behavior of significant numbers of
130. See, e.g., ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION 137-50 (2001)
(describing the confusion that the "butterfly ballots" caused in Palm Beach County in the 2000
election, despite the fact that the ballots had been designed specifically to make voting easier for
elderly voters and that samples had been sent to all voters prior to election day).
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citizens who have remained disengaged until now because they understand
that their individual vote is unlikely to matter and so have decided to find
less futile uses for their time than to spend it on becoming informed about
politics.
Enact Patriot. The nation will not get smaller and the government's
response to the issues that confront it will become neither easier to
understand nor more susceptible to being effectively monitored by the
cumulative efforts of alert individual citizens. The hard fact is that very few
individual citizens can realistically expect to have a meaningful impact on
much of anything that the government does, and this reality will hold even
if large private contributions could be entirely eliminated. If the lack of
citizen participation is a function of rational voter ignorance in the face of
the low probability of having an impact on outcomes, Patriot dollars will do
little-if anything at all-to increase it.
The authors opine that if their initiative is enacted and nevertheless
"fails to generate broad engagement, our country is in worse trouble than
we thought."'131 Patriot is unlikely to generate significantly broader
engagement than that which presently exists, but this conclusion does not
signify that our country is "in trouble." It means only that the problem of
generating broad, meaningful, informed citizen political engagement over a
government as sprawling and complex in a country as populous and diverse
among a population as vibrant and productive as ours cannot be solved by
the simple expedient of giving citizens $50 each to spend on their favorite
politicians or political groups. Mobilizing citizen engagement in political
issues is a project that deserves the sustained attention of serious scholars
because a reliably informed, alert, and politically active citizenry is the
most effective means of making government accountable. The challenge is
momentous because the problem is systemic. It is improbable that it will
yield to Patriot's magic wand. The wonder is that Ackerman and Ayres
seem to have convinced themselves, and try so hard to convince their
readers, that their initiative would have any discernible impact at all.
C. The Cure: The Secret Donation Booth
The secret donation booth is the other part of Ackerman and Ayres's
proposed cure for our big-money ills. They rightly bemoan the failure of
previous campaign finance reform efforts which, due to their transactional
focus, have predictably and inevitably generated what they call a "reform-
evasion cycle. 13 2 Ackerman and Ayres explain: "As reformers succeed in
131. ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 3, at 89.
132. Id. at 46. For a good brief account of the many failures of the campaign finance reforms
of the 1970s, see GILLON, supra note 100, at 200-34. Brief experience to date with McCain-
Feingold suggests that we are in for more of the same. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, New Ways To
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abolishing one or another suspect transaction, donors and politicians [and,
the authors might have added, their lawyers] respond by skirting the new
law and designing new forms of dealing that permit business as usual. 133
The result is that the influence of big money continues unabated. The secret
donation booth, they think, will bring an end to this recurring sequence of
frustrated attempts to cleanse the political game. By "disrupting the
informational conditions under which donors and politicians can deal with
one another,"' 1 4 it will eliminate the incentives that they presently have to
devise new ways to evade the ever-tightening contribution limitations.
Ackerman and Ayres claim that the secret donation booth is but a
variation on the theme of the secret ballot, which was introduced in this
country in the late nineteenth century and is widely credited (along with
restrictions on electioneering around polling places) with having
significantly reduced voter intimidation and fraud. 35 The secret ballot and
the secret donation booth both disrupt the exchange of information between
corrupt deal-makers and thereby, claim Ackerman and Ayres, bring an end
to their deal-making. And, of course, to the extent that neither voter
intimidation nor corrupt deal-making between candidates and influence
seekers can proceed without the exchange of reliable information, the
analogy between the secret ballot and the secret donation booth does seem
to work.
On closer analysis, insofar as it suggests that the secret donation booth
has the same potential to eliminate the influence of wealthy contributors as
the secret ballot had to restrict the ability of corrupt politicians to intimidate
voters, the analogy breaks down. It does so not because the disruption of
information is in principle a flawed corruption-prevention strategy; to the
contrary, the idea of disrupting the flow of corrupt information is an
intriguing one, and would be even more so if it were possible to disrupt the
flow of corrupt information without also disrupting the flow of legitimate
conversations between politicians, their supporters, and voters. If requiring
campaign contributors to keep the amounts of their contributions secret
could eliminate the undue influence of money in politics, and if we knew
how to distinguish between due and undue influence, then the analogy
between the secret ballot and the secret donation booth would be a powerful
one.
Harness Soft Money in Works: Political Groups Poised To Take Huge Donations, WASH. POST,
Aug. 25, 2002, atAl.
133. ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 3, at 45.
134. Id. at 46.
135. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992) (sustaining a Tennessee statute
prohibiting the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within
100 feet of the entrance to a polling place, and tracing victory over the twin evils of voter
intimidation and election fraud to a "secret ballot secured in part by a restricted zone around the
voting compartments").
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In contrast to the secret donation booth, however, the secret ballot was
an extremely simple solution, and it was cheap to enforce. Officials needed
only to provide voters with a private place to vote and to shield voters'
choices from prying eyes until their ballots were safely in the ballot box.
Secret ballots required neither elaborate subsidiary rules nor a bureaucracy
to ensure that they were carried out. A secret ballot system has no gaps to
be plugged, and it does not demand a cadre of administering guardians who
themselves need to be guarded from corrupting influences. Indeed, the
secret ballot is a virtually self-enforcing solution to the problem of voter
intimidation.
On the other hand, an elaborate and complex regulatory structure is
crucial to the successful implementation of the secret donation booth in
order to thwart big givers' and ambitious politicians' efforts to surmount its
informational barriers. Ackerman and Ayres realize this necessity, which
explains why they devised so many regulatory bells and enforcement
whistles. To be sure, the rules they devise for donors are simple,
straightforward, and "easily understood by everybody: Never give or accept
gifts that haven't passed through the secret donation booth. Any direct
transfer of cash is a felony comparable to vote-buying, and punishable
accordingly." '1 36 But the secret donation booth through which the gifts
would have to pass is anything but simple, straightforward, and easily
understood. It requires an elaborate bureaucratic infrastructure, and a
substantial portion of the book addresses the difficulties of designing it
(chapter 7), figuring out ways of plugging its gaps (chapter 8), and devising
means to safeguard its administrators (chapter 9). Most of the model statute
prescribes administrative and bureaucratic details rather than announcing
the plain unvarnished rules that would apply to donors. These parts of the
book reflect an effort to identify as many potential loopholes as the authors
could possibly foresee and to close them before they could be exploited by
devious rich guys seeking new ways to donate big bucks and credibly brag
about it to the candidates whose favors they seek. They represent an attempt
to design a no-exit strategy, to create an airtight system of financing
campaigns that will stymie every effort by wealthy contributors and corrupt
politicians to evade its confines. However one might describe the system
that emerges, one could not accurately describe it as either simple or cheap
to enforce.
Whether the no-exit strategy would work even on its own terms is
questionable. This is in part because elaborate schemes like the secret
donation booth often fail. Their designers are able to foresee neither the
entire range of evasive strategies that the regulated parties will adopt when
they are confronted with the new legal reality, nor the regulatory
136. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 52.
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pathologies that will emerge as the complex bureaucratic structure
evolves. 3 7  Indeed, because of the complexity and inescapable
unpredictability of the world, the only certain effect of the full-blown secret
donation booth is that few of its consequences can be anticipated. But even
if the secret donation booth were implemented as Ackerman and Ayres
envision, and even if no loopholes remained to be exploited in the new
campaign finance regime, the problems of special-interest deal-making
would surely continue to plague our democracy. Rich donors would have
reasons to seek avenues to political influence other than by making
campaign contributions.138 More importantly, the dominance of special-
interest groups in the legislative process is not a function of big money.
Quite to the contrary, special-interest groups, whether they represent
business interests, or abortion-rights advocates, or environmentalists, are an
artifact of the unyielding reality that collective action problems are endemic
to representative democracy.
One reason for the secret ballot's success is that it was designed to
solve a relatively constrained problem that was susceptible to a rather
simple solution that neither brought about a flood of unintended
consequences nor had the potential to make things worse. Voter
intimidation posed a genuine threat to self-government: It was not an
artifact of representative government's collective action problems, nor was
it a necessary corollary of anyone's conception of representative
democracy. Thus, mounting a principled argument to the effect that it
should be left unregulated was virtually impossible. For this reason, the
secret ballot (combined with restrictions on electioneering near polling
places) provided a nearly complete solution to the problem it had been
designed to address. Voters who could not be harassed as they approached
the voting booth, and who could keep their votes secret, were simply no
longer susceptible to intimidation. By contrast, the problem that the secret
donation booth supposedly solves-the problem of the unequal political
influence of wealthy citizens and of special-interest deal-making-is
practically boundless. Ackerman and Ayres diagnose big-money
contributors as what ails democracy. The cure they prescribe is the secret
donation booth. But because big money is not in fact the principal source of
137. Cf GILLON, supra note 100, at 235-40 (offering generalizations about why unintended
consequences so often emerge from well-intentioned purposive collective action); JEFFREY L.
PRFSSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (1973) (analyzing and describing the failure of the
Economic Development Administration's program to provide permanent new jobs to minorities in
Oakland, California).
138. Cf Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1705, 1705 (1999) ("[E]very reform effort to constrain political actors
produces a corresponding series of reactions by those with power to hold onto it.").
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
2003] 1165
The Yale Law Journal
the problem, the secret donation booth, in contrast to the secret ballot, is
unlikely to be much of a palliative.
D. The Prognosis
Ackerman and Ayres think that their new paradigm-the combination
of Patriot dollars and the secret donation booth-will effect significant and
systematic changes in "the kinds of policies that might actually get
enacted."13 9 They identify who they think the big losers will be, who the big
winners will be, and what the fate of pork-barrel legislation will be. They
also describe the political dynamic that they think is likely to ensue as
"parties, ideological groups, and social movements" 140 compete for Patriot
dollars. The picture they paint is not convincing.
As this Review has sought to emphasize, the political scene today is
dominated by interest-group competition. From the Founding era to the
present day, the central organizational dilemma in designing a republican
form of government has been to devise ways to control factions. Modem
representative government is a colossal collective action problem, beset by
incalculable agency costs and pervasive informational asymmetries
between citizens, well-organized groups, bureaucrats, and elected
representatives. This is reality. It is neither a nightmare nor a utopian
dream. It renders the problem of factions perversely intractable. And
although they recognize the faction problem, Ackerman and Ayres's
depiction of it is little more than a caricature. Because they focus
exclusively on big-money special interests, the story they tell is incomplete.
Special interests of all kinds are a pervasive phenomenon. The competition
among them is fierce-and, again, it is intrinsic to representative
government. To Ackerman and Ayres, only one special interest-"big
money"---exerts a malign influence on legislative outcomes, and they
clearly disapprove of what they think is its agenda on normative grounds.
The authors' narrow focus on big business, however, prevents them
from recognizing that all interests are special interests-even the interests
of ideological groups like the Sierra Club and the NRA, which, along with
political parties, would become the principal political intermediaries should
Patriot and the secret donation booth be enacted. Special- interest groups of
all kinds, whether they represent corporate interests or ideological ones, are
an artifact of the collective action problems that all modem republican
democracies confront, and they both help to solve and tend to exacerbate
the problems.1 4 ' Ackerman and Ayres misconceive the reason why all
139. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 16t.
140. Id. at 175.
141. See Lillian R. BeVier, Campaign Finance Reform: Specious Arguments, Intractable
Dilemmas, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1258, 1274-75 (1994) (arguing that special-interest groups provide
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special interests, and the informational asymmetries they exploit, threaten
democratic governance, which is that the interests they represent are
narrow, not that they are normatively inappropriate.
Because they paint such an incomplete picture of what ails modem
democracy, Ackerman and Ayres prescribe the wrong remedy and then
overestimate its ability to cure. They think that the big losers under their
new paradigm will be "the political interests that currently push their
agendas with large private contributions," which they simplistically equate
with "corporate America"'142 because corporate PACs "contributed 30
percent of all PAC donations in 2000 " 143 and because PACs connected to
"trade, membership, and health organizations" contributed another 22.5
percent of total PAC donations.1 44 In their view, "[i]t doesn't take a rocket
scientist to recognize that the new paradigm will reduce the influence of
corporate lobbyists.' 45 There is no doubt that the new paradigm would
change the way corporate lobbyists ply their trade, but that does not
necessarily mean that it would cause their relative influence to decrease.
More likely, the new system would simply divert corporate efforts to exert
political influence into new avenues. After all, the new paradigm does
nothing to reduce the incentives for corporate lobbyists and others like them
to influence political outcomes (nor could it), and because these individuals
and organizations already know much more than average citizens about
how to be effective with politicians, the odds are long indeed that they will
end up permanently as big losers in the competitive struggle for political
power.
Ackerman and Ayres predict that "big business [will] provide a smaller
share of [the] private money" donated to candidates and groups. 146 This
forecast reflects the authors' assumption that moneyed interests contribute
money only in order to sway candidates' positions on issues, and that
candidates routinely change their positions in accordance with the wishes of
their largest contributors. This assumption is not only contrary to a
considerable body of evidence, 47 but it also ignores the more likely
a means of overcoming collective action problems caused by individual inertia, but that they also
have the potential to exert systemically malign influence as well, particularly in the form of rent-
seeking).
142. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 171.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 171-72.
145. Id. at 173.
146, Id. at 172.
147. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 798 (1990)
("[T]he scientific evidence that political money matters in legislative decision making is
surprisingly weak."); see also FRANK J. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS 316 (1988)
("[T]he evidence simply does not support... claims about the 'buying' of Congress."); Janet M.
Grenzke, PACs and the Congressional Supermarket: The Currency Is Complex, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 1, 1 (1989) (finding "little evidence that the contributions of 120 PAC's affiliated with 10
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possibility that people contribute to candidates who already agree with
them.1 48 Individuals and groups contribute to candidates, in other words,
because of those candidates' views-not in spite of them. Because it would
remain important to business interests to elect like-minded candidates even
if the new paradigm were enacted, it seems unlikely that corporate interests
would significantly reduce their contributions even if they had to make
them anonymously. Still, Ackerman and Ayres assume that there will be
significantly less private money under the new paradigm and that whatever
"private money [remains] will be diluted by a flood of Patriot dollars.' '149
As a consequence of there being less private money in the system, and of
most of what there is not being traceable to individual or corporate
contributors, they foresee a substantial reduction in a certain kind of
legislative pork, namely, that in which "a concentrated group of industrial
producers use state power to exploit a large group of unorganized
consumers."'"5 As a result, they think that "the dollar savings on porkish
legislation [such as reduced sugar tariffs and too-lenient environmental
regulations] could easily dwarf the costs of running Patriot."' 151 They do not
apparently believe, nor does it seem to matter to them, that the "dollar
savings on porkish legislation" would come from reduced government
spending. In fact, they do not make clear how or by whom the savings on
too-lenient environmental regulations would be realized, although of course
the savings produced by reduced sugar tariffs would be experienced by
consumers rather than appearing in the federal budget at all. But they do not
expect federal spending itself to decline. To the contrary, they anticipate
that, instead of doing the will of industrial polluters, members of Congress
will pander to their constituents by funding projects that can "generate lots
of patriotic cash from ordinary constituents" 52 -which would result in
funding "more neighborhood centers for the masses, fewer irrigation
projects for desert agriculture."'1 53
organizations affected the voting patterns of House members who served continuously from 1975
to 1982").
148. Larry Sabato, Real and Imagined Corruption in Campaign Financing, in ELECTIONS
AMERICAN STYLE 155, 160 (A. James Reichley ed., 1987). Similarly, David Austen-Smith notes:
[Ihf the rationale for access is informational, access will only be granted to groups
whose preferences over consequences are sufficiently close to those of the legislator to
permit credible information transmission .... Only those groups who fall within this
category will be willing to pay for access... [and] the legislator will be willing to grant
access to such groups independent of any financial incentive.
David Austen-Smith, Campaign Contributions and Access, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 566, 566
(1995).




153. Id. Note once again that this prediction appears to represent a tacit acknowledgment that
if citizens were given the opportunity to vote with Patriot dollars, they would do so because of
self-interested rather than public-regarding motives.
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PART III
A. Rhetorical Style, Rhetorical Substance
Ackerman and Ayres confidently predict that their "new paradigm will
place ordinary Americans firmly in the driver's seat" and that average
citizens will no longer be "passive spectators" but "will take charge of the
future of politics."' 154 As I have argued, because their diagnosis of
democracy's fundamental problem is so incomplete, their predictions
wildly exaggerate the likely success of their scheme. They also illustrate a
characteristic feature of the book's exposition that is worth noting because
it creates such an impediment to genuine engagement with their argument.
Throughout the book, the authors indulge in so much rhetorical hyperbole
that their descriptions of present political reality, their analyses of its
problems, and their forecasts for the future are truly impenetrable. For
example, they seek to convey the impression that, unless their paradigm
becomes law, the country is likely to become a full-blown plutocracy. They
relentlessly and obsessively intone their contempt for "big money." They
claim that the country is experiencing an "ideological drift toward extreme
forms of market capitalism' 155 and a "national drift to oligarchy."'
' 56
One cannot evaluate such claims or attempt a rigorous refutation of
them because these catch phrases lack any discernible empirical content.
For all their confident condemnation of it, and despite the fact that they
premise their entire argument on its badness, the authors specify neither
what makes money "big" nor, except in their profoundly incomplete
"standard reconciliation," what makes "big money" bad. They do not
describe the facts from which they discern the ideological drift toward
extreme forms of market capitalism, nor do they identify what forms of
market capitalism they regard as extreme. They never define what they
denote when they speak of corruption, nor do they explain why only some
kinds of special-interest deal-making ought to be condemned. They extol
the virtues of popular sovereignty but fail to provide a meaningful
definition of the term. And they let the term oligarchy speak for itself.157
The analysis in Part II represents an attempt at a fair interpretation of
the authors' claims. Uncertainty about whether my interpretation of their
claims is accurate necessarily persists because the opacity of their language
confounds any effort to discern the precise meaning of those claims. But I
154. Id. at 177.
155. Id. at 160.
156. Id. at 161.
157. As one anonymous wag has suggested, however, "In a world that contains Saudi Arabia
and China, someone who says that the United States is in danger of turning into an oligarchy
should be struck about the head and shoulders with his thesaurus."
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raise the issue of the authors' rhetorical approach not only to pose a
semantic quibble, but also to highlight the fact that it frustrates serious
inquiry about whether Ackerman and Ayres have accurately diagnosed the
problem that their new paradigm is supposed to solve. The discomforting
truth about the book's rhetoric is that it appears expressly designed to
foreclose debate on precisely that score.
Ackerman and Ayres apparently assume that what they see (and feel)
when they look at the world is also what their readers see. It is possible that
their pejorative and melodramatic characterizations have real-world
referents for which the characterizations are simply shorthand, and that they
thus convey genuine meaning to those who instinctively share the authors'
world view and political convictions. But a reader who does not share these
convictions will not know precisely what the authors mean and will be
unable to form a clear and definite picture of the nature of the phenomena
to which they refer. Such a reader is likely to be unhappy at being excluded
from the debate. More importantly, she might worry that she has been
deliberately stymied in her effort to parse the book's meaning and to
evaluate its analysis.
The authors' failure to specify what they mean by corruption, and to
deploy the term with more meticulous care, is particularly troubling. In
order for their proposals to enjoy even a modicum of constitutional
legitimacy, they must be supported by a plausible corruption-prevention
rationale: Preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption is the sole
rationale that the Supreme Court has accepted for campaign finance reform
and, "[b]arring a major shift in this area of law, corruption is the criterion
by which the constitutionality of further reforms in campaign finance
regulation will be measured."' 58 Of special note, the Court has explicitly
rejected equality as a permissible objective of reform. 159 The notion that
campaign contributions and expenditures that are not corrupt, or that do not
present the appearance of corruption, could be limited or regulated simply
as a means of leveling the political playing field has squarely been
foreclosed.
That being said, corruption is a notoriously elusive concept. Its
meaning is particularly hard to pin down when the context requires that a
line be drawn between illegitimate exchanges of money for votes and
158. Thomas F. Burke, The Concept of Corruption in Campaign Finance Law, 14 CONST.
COMMENT. 127, 127 (1997) (emphasis added).
159. As the Buckley Court concluded:
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First
Amendment, which was designed to secure the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources, and to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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legitimate contributions to support politicians and policies with whom the
donor is in sympathy. Buckley and its early progeny defined corruption
quite narrowly to include only explicit (if subtle) deals between contributors
and legislators: "Corruption is a subversion of the political process. Elected
officials are influenced to act contrary to their obligations of office by the
prospect of financial gain to themselves or infusions of money into their
campaigns. The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo:
dollars for political favors."1 6 0
Note that, in principle, the definition of corruption that this excerpt
embraces reflects an implicit conclusion that the amount of a contribution
has no intrinsic bearing on whether it is corrupt. If it is not given in
exchange "for political favors," it is not corrupt even if it is very large in
amount.161
Recent cases have suggested that a broader conception of corruption
may be constitutionally acceptable as the predicate for reform efforts. In
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, for example, the Court
seemed to endorse a definition of corruption that embraced the notion that
the electoral process itself-and not just elected officials-might be the
target of corruption-prevention legislation.1 62 And in Nixon v. Shrink
Missouri Government PA C, it suggested that legislators might legitimately
act from "a concern not confined to bribery of public officials, but
extending to the broader threat from politicians too compliant with the
wishes of large contributors. 163 Parsing the meaning of this statement
presents a major difficulty. The Court has not specified the kind of behavior
it has in mind when it refers to officeholders as "too compliant." 164 Since it
is and always has been appropriate for voters to signal their policy
preferences to those who desire to represent them, and it is and always has
been appropriate for elected officials in Congress to represent the interests
of their constituents, it will be a challenge for the Court to specify when an
official who acts according to her constituents' wishes can be said to have
been "too compliant." This challenge is particularly daunting since studies
indicate that the main factors determining legislators' votes are their party
affiliation, ideology, and constituent preferences. 165 Thus, when a
160. Fed. Election Comm'n v. Nat'l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 497
(1985) (emphasis added).
161. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29-30 (sustaining relatively low contribution limits not on the
grounds that contributions over the maximum were necessarily corrupt, but rather on the need to
draw a clear line and on the legislature's relative institutional advantage in drawing it).
162. 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990).
163. 528 U.S. 377, 389 (2000).
164. Elizabeth Garrett, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law: The Future of
Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in Congress, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
165. See Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of
Campaign Finance Reform, 105 YALE L.J. 1049, 1068 (1996) (describing these studies).
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legislator's vote correlates with the interests of contributors, it is more
likely that contributors have sent money to people whose perspectives are
compatible with their own than that, as Ackerman and Ayres seem to think,
the legislator changed her position in order to secure the contribution.
Indeed, Ackerman and Ayres simply ignore the fact that "[s]tudies that do
attempt to control for ideological and constituent preferences find no
evidence of any quidpro quo manifest in the roll-call votes of members of
Congress."1
66
The important fact remains that, while the Supreme Court has yet to
define the kind of legislative behavior that can legitimately be deemed
corrupt, it has not retreated from its distinction between corruption
prevention and equality in the context of candidate elections. Corruption
prevention is a legitimate goal for campaign finance reform. Equalization of
political power is not.
In the new paradigm, however, talk of preventing corruption provides
rhetorical sheep's clothing for what on examination turns out to be an
aggressive wolf with a hearty appetite for equalization. Ackerman and
Ayres obscure the paradigm's true nature by keeping their definition of
corruption opaque. They thereby free themselves to deploy the term to
connote whatever meaning serves the purposes of a particular argument.
Sometimes, for example, they use the term to refer to the kinds of quid pro
quo deals to which the Supreme Court referred in Buckley, as when they
assert that "[a] victorious politician is guilty of corruption if he delivers the
goods to his campaign contributors in too obvious a fashion.' 67 Sometimes
they use it more loosely, to imply that any contributor access to or influence
over politicians is corrupt, as when they praise the secret donation booth
because it "makes it harder for candidates to sell access or influence" and
tout the virtues of anonymous donations because they "disrupt influence
peddling." 68 Sometimes they assume that all contributions of more than
$200 under the present system are corrupt, as when they justify mandated
anonymity of all such contributions by reference to the law's traditional
"suspicio[n] of encounters with politicians that end up with a transfer of
money" (which in turn leads the authors to conclude that requiring all
donations to be anonymous does not violate freedom of association since
"nobody has a right to 'freedom of association' for purposes of
corruption" 169). And sometimes they simply equate corruption with
inequality, and write as though they were the same phenomenon, as when
they call for reshaping "the political marketplace [to] enable it to become
more responsive to the judgments of equal citizens than to the preferences
166. Milyo et al., supra note 115, at 80.
167. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 5.
168. Id. at 6.
169. Id. at 151.
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of unequal property owners,"' 170 or when they refer to the "corrupting
influence of unequal wealth."
171
With such semantic sleights of hand, Ackerman and Ayres disguise
both the deep cynicism of their understanding of how our political process
works and the fact that their ultimate agenda is not quite what it purports to
be. Their agenda is not an attempt to solve a garden-variety corruption-
prevention problem. It is, instead, relentlessly redistributive and could be
defended on corruption-prevention grounds only by taking as descriptively
accurate Ackerman and Ayres's pervasively derisive account of politics
today. They imply that candidates and elected officials routinely change
their votes on major issues in response to campaign contributions. They
imply that there is something amiss when large contributors gain influence
with, and access to, elected officials. What worries them is surely neither
the fact that politicians can be influenced by their constituents nor that
citizens seek access to office holders, for they are surely not claiming that
no one should have access to, or influence upon, candidates. Rather, what
must bother them is that large contributors simply have more influence than
others. It is thus inequality, not corruption, that they seek to ameliorate.
An agenda to redistribute political power is not necessarily normatively
unappealing, 7 2 but Ackerman and Ayres's semantic strategy of obscuring
the fact that that agenda-and not preventing corruption-drives their new
paradigm is troublesome. Rather than inviting thoughtful consideration, the
effect of the strategy is to avoid joining issue on the most fundamental
matters. Meaningful debate about campaign finance regulation cannot
proceed unless participants in that debate confront two questions. First,
what exactly constitutes the corruption that the Court has said campaign
finance regulation might legitimately prevent? And second, should the
Court explicitly overrule Buckley's rejection of political equalization as a
rationale for campaign finance reform? Unfortunately, Ackerman and
Ayres finesse the answers to both.
170. Id. at 14.
171. Id. at 27.
172. David Strauss suggests that corruption is, in any case, a problem that derives from
inequality:
If somehow an appropriate level of equality were achieved, much of the reason to be
concerned about corruption would no longer exist. And to the extent the concern about
corruption would persist under conditions of equality, it is actually a concern
about ... the tendency for democratic politics to become a struggle among interest
groups [which is inherent in any system of representative government].
Strauss, supra note 106, at 1370.
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B. First Amendment Analysis
Ackerman and Ayres claim that their new paradigm, as embodied in
their model statute, "conforms in all respects to prevailing judicial
doctrine."'' 73 This conclusion is not so unproblematic as they would portray
it. The reading of Buckley upon which they base their argument is, to say
the least, idiosyncratic. And much of the support they offer for their view
takes the form of conclusory statements rather than reasoned analysis.
Finally, the new paradigm raises important First Amendment questions that
they fail to ask.
To take up these points in turn, begin with "three large points" about
which, on the authors' reading of Buckley (but not on anyone else's of
which I am aware), the Court had "something important to say.' 74 First,
they argue that the Buckley Court expressed a "preference for subsidies"''I7
and even suggested that "serious campaign reform should not happen
without a significant injection of public funds."'176 True, Buckley did sustain
the present system of providing public money for presidential candidates
who agree to a limit on private contributions and expenditures, but in the
opinion itself the Court neither expressed a preference for subsidies nor
suggested that "a significant injection of public funds" ought to be part of
any serious campaign reform. 17 7 Moreover, Ackerman and Ayres's claim
that Buckley was "remarkably accommodating where governmental
subsidies are concerned" 178 seems overblown, as does their assertion that
the case "expressly authorizes Congress to offer plutocrats a deal: The
government will give them subsidies provided that they waive their right to
spend freely from their bottomless bank accounts."' 79 The remarkable
accommodation and express authorization appeared in a single footnote
173. ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 3, at 141.
174. Id. at 159.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 142. Indeed, Ackerman and Ayres claim that public subsidies were one of the
"twin principles" that Buckley embraced. Id. at 157.
177. In sustaining congressional power to publicly finance election campaigns against a First
Amendment challenge in Buckley, the Court held that public financing of presidential elections
"as a means to reform the electoral process was clearly a choice within [Congress's] power." 424
U.S. 1, 90 (1976). Since "Congress was legislating for the 'general welfare'-to reduce the
deleterious influence of large contributions on our political process, to facilitate communication
by candidates with the electorate, and to free candidates from the rigors of fundraising," id. at 91,
it was not for the Court to decide that the chosen means are "'bad,' 'unwise,' or 'unworkable,"' id.
And in rejecting appellants' claim that public financing of election campaigns ought to be held to
violate the First Amendment by analogy to the Religion Clauses, the Court described the
provision at issue as "a congressional effort, not to abridge, restrict or censor speech, but rather to
use public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in the electoral
process, goals vital to a self-governing people." Id. at 92-93.
178. ACKERMAN & AYREs, supra note 3, at 142; see also id. ("When it comes to adding
public money ... Buckley gives Congress a remarkably free hand.").
179. Id. at 143.
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stating that "Congress may engage in public financing of election
campaigns and may condition acceptance of public funds on an agreement
by the candidate to abide by specified expenditure limitations.
' ' 80
The second large point that Ackerman and Ayres claim for Buckley is
that it expressed a "concern with the power of incumbents.' 81 It is difficult
to pinpoint the source of this claim, and Ackerman and Ayres do not
provide it. The Court addressed incumbent protection only once in the
opinion, in response to the argument that the contribution limitations
worked an invidious discrimination against challengers. Citing the absence
of record evidence to support the argument, the Court rejected it.'82 In a
footnote, the Court acknowledged that "the overall effect of the
contribution and expenditure limitations enacted by Congress could
foreclose any fair opportunity of a successful challenge."""13 It concluded,
however, that since the campaign expenditure limitations were invalid, it
did not have to express an opinion about whether invidious discrimination
would have resulted from the "full sweep of the legislation as enacted.'
184
Describing this brief reference, in a 145-page opinion, as one of the
opinion's "large points" is, to say the least, a bit of a stretch.
According to Ackerman and Ayres, Buckley made a third "large point"
of emphasizing "the expressive dimensions of campaign contributions.' 8 5
Perhaps so, but it is equally noteworthy-although Ackerman and Ayres do
not note it-that the Buckley Court also acknowledged the communicative
aspect of contributions 186 and emphasized the informational benefits of
disclosure.' 87 In addition, it expressly and in no uncertain terms rejected
equalization of the "relative ability of individuals and groups to influence
the outcome of elections"88 as a legitimate goal of campaign finance
regulation.
When Ackerman and Ayres turn their attention to the specific
constitutional issues raised by the secret donation booth, they purport to
find themselves "[o]nce again... on easy street."'1 89 The Justices, they say,
"[l]ike most sensible people.., are well aware that big givers can gain
special influence over politicians, and they have regularly sustained
legislation that can plausibly be viewed as efforts to reduce the risk.., of
180. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 57 n.65.
181. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 159.
182. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30-32.
183. Id. at31 n.33.
184. Id.
185. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 159.
186. 424 U.S. at 20-21 ("[Contribution limits entail] only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor's ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a general
expression of support for the candidate and his views . .
187. Id. at 66-67.
188. Id. at 48.
189. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 147.
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corruption.' 190 They go on to insist that their own "approach to private
giving is carefully tailored to eliminate only those donations that generate
the possibility of influence peddling," 191 a statement particularly difficult to
credit in view of their proposal to require all contributions of more than the
paltry sum of $200 to be anonymous. Such a low limit hardly seems
"carefully tailored" to eliminate only potential influence peddling. 92
With respect to the anonymity requirement, the authors are content
simply to assert that it "do[es] not in any way trench upon the donor's
freedom of speech,"'1 93 apparently viewing as dispositive their model
statute's refusal "to impose any new restrictions on the things private
citizens can say to one another.,194 But in forbidding private individuals
from directly contributing to candidates and verifiably disclosing the
amount of their contributions, the authors' model statute creates an
impenetrable barrier to communication and to the flow of information
between candidates, their supporters, and the voting public. That private
individuals remain free to say anything they want to one another hardly
answers whether mandated anonymity trenches on freedom of speech. The
real question is whether individuals have a First Amendment right to
disclose in a verifiable fashion-to the candidate and to the public-the
amount of their support for particular politicians. Ackerman and Ayres do
not confront the fact that information about the source and the amount of
contributions to candidates is, at the very least, highly relevant to political
debate, nor do they convincingly demonstrate that the interest of individuals
in truthfully communicating their support of particular candidates is not of
First Amendment value. Instead, they assert that permitting small donors
"to operate under false pretenses"' 195 uses "free speech as an anticorruption
tool '196 because small donors' exaggerations "undermine the capacity of
big donors to obtain special influence."'197 They describe this as a decision
"to fight corruption by facilitating more speech,"' 9 and they think it is
"certain to withstand the most searching constitutional scrutiny."' 99 When
they assess the possibility that the requirement of personal delivery of
contributions to the secret donation booth might constitute an impermissible
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. It is perhaps revealing that, when Ackerman and Ayres set about to defend the claim
cited in the text, they do so with an example of a donor contemplating a S 10,000 contribution in
return for "special favors," about which they conclude that "[s]pecial dealing of this kind has
always been barred under the Court's corruption-fighting rationale." Id. at 148. Campaign
contributions in the $200 range hardly represent special dealing "of this kind."
193. Id.
194. Id. at 150 (second emphasis added).
195. Id. at 149.
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restriction of freedom of association, they dismiss it by resorting to the
implication that any contribution directly to a politician is by definition
"corrupt" and then concluding that, "[b]ecause nobody has a right to
'freedom of association' for purposes of corruption, the new restriction falls
outside the zone of constitutional protection, and no further balancing is
required. ,200
The biggest source of doubt about the soundness of Ackerman and
Ayres's constitutional analysis is its failure to engage in a sustained
confrontation with the two questions about the secret donation booth that
are likely to pose the most difficulty for the Court. First, the secret donation
booth substitutes for the Court's most favored anticorruption tool-
disclosure-its exact opposite, anonymity. Despite this, Ackerman and
Ayres devote surprisingly few words to defending the key proposition that
disclosure is a less effective tool than anonymity-and when they do
discuss disclosure, they imply that its principal role in political dialogue is
to enable politicians to make corrupt deals with their contributors. 20 1 They
implicitly discount, therefore, the wisdom of the traditional First
Amendment view that information in the hands of the public is the best way
to fight corruption.2 °2 Moreover, they utterly fail to confront the Supreme
Court's statement in Buckley that disclosure serves governmental interests
important to the "free functioning of our national institutions [because it]
provides the electorate with information. 20 3 Their analysis simply assumes
that the Court will readily turn its back on the praise it heaped on the
disclosure remedy in Buckley.20 4 Finally, Ackerman and Ayres offer no
support for their implicit claim that the draconian limits imposed in
connection with the secret donation booth-namely, that all contributions
of more than $200 must be anonymous-represent the least restrictive
means of achieving their anticorruption goal.
The second aspect of the secret donation booth likely to be an issue for
the Court is that the proposal's coercive mandate for anonymity will require
the FEC to meddle constantly in political dialogue. Despite the authors'
insistence that they intend to preserve maximum amounts of donor freedom
and that they "protect[] more speech than is constitutionally required" 205 by
guaranteeing "every American the right to say anything he wants about the
size and nature of his donations, 2 6 the fact remains that the secret donation
200. Id. at 151.
201. See id. at 5-6.
202. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ("[l]nformed public opinion is the
most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment.").
203. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976) (emphasis added, internal quotation marks
omitted).
204. See id. at 66-67.
205. ACKERMAN & AYRES, supra note 3, at 150.
206. Id. at 148.
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booth is mandatory in every aspect. Indeed, the authors want it to be
absolutely the only game in town, and they spend considerable effort
making it loophole free. Moreover, they require the FEC to engage in
constant fine-tuning-in order to make sure that the public-private funding
balance is maintained, for example-which would involve the Commission
in almost constant oversight of the campaign process. Thus, whatever else
the new paradigm might be, it is most certainly not an embodiment of
political freedom. Nor does it appear to be consistent with the principle,
affirmed in Buckley, that "[i]n the free society ordained by our Constitution
it is not the government, but the people-individually as citizens and
candidates and collectively as associations and political committees-who
must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in
a political campaign. 20 7
CONCLUSION
Voting with Dollars is a deeply flawed book. It offers two genuinely
new ideas for campaign reform, but when the opaque rhetoric disguising
them is stripped away, the weakness of their conceptual underpinnings
becomes evident. The utopian premises implicit in its reform proposals are
hollow, and the authors' attempt to give them content by outlining a
complicated administrative apparatus for their implementation fails. The
book provides a simplistic, cynical, and descriptively unsustainable account
of what ails modem American democracy. It prescribes a cure that is quite
certain to prove ineffective. It defends the constitutionality of the plan it
offers with an analysis that is idiosyncratic at best, troublingly incomplete
and inaccurate at worst. The topic of the book is of enduring importance,
and ideas about what's wrong with democracy and how to fix it are always
welcome. But don't look to Ackerman and Ayres for diagnosis or treatment
of what ails us because, to borrow a phrase, their medicine cabinet is
empty.
20 8
207. 424 U.S. at 57.
208. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto
Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. CHI L. REv. 239 (1967).
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